Any federal policy that results in the eviction of nasturtiumtoting grandmothers and well-meaning community activists from public housing is bound to elicit criticism from both investigative reporters and public housing residents alike. 3 In 1996, President Clinton announced during his State of the Union Address that " [c] riminal gang members and drug dealers are destroying the lives of decent tenants. From now on, the rule for residents who commit crime and pedal [sic] drugs should be one strike and you're out. ' 4 How did the reach of the President's national policy declaration expand to envelop the very "decent tenants" the President intended to protect? 5 The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's controversial "one-strike" regulation, C.F.R. § 966.4, empowers local public housing authorities ("PHAs") to terminate a resident's tenancy for "any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or quiet enjoyment of the PHAs... premises... or (B) any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises." 6 Section 966.4 extends far beyond evicting individuals for their own criminal actions; it creates a cause for termination of tenancy where a "tenant, any member of the household, a guest, or another person under the tenant's control," engages in criminal activity. 7 Popular critique of this provision has not focused on the notion of eviction for criminal activity. In a 1995 national poll, 88% of the adult African-Americans surveyed agreed that peo-security guards. 7 Ms. Chavez's son was neither a household member nor a guest at the time he allegedly committed this criminal act, but public housing officials deemed him to be under his mother's control. 8 While familial relations between tenants and criminal actors can be sufficient to establish the required "control" that may trigger eviction, 9 some courts may require that the relationship consist of more than blood ties. 2 "
PHAs have also employed the one-strike policy to evict entire households for the criminal activity of one wayward household member, on the reasoning that section 966.4 triggers a termination of the entire tenancy, and does not just evict individuals for their own criminal behavior. 2 For instance, in Charlotte Housing Authority v. Patterson, 22 the Authority moved to evict Roxieanne Patterson and her two daughters for the alleged criminal behavior of a third child listed on the lease, her son Jonathan Givens. 5 Lastly, a notice of eviction may be served on a tenant for a guest's criminal activity. 24 In Chicago Housing Authority v. Rose, 25 the Chicago Housing Authority ("CHA") filed a complaint against Jacqueline Rose, seeking possession of her CabriniGreen public housing apartment, after police found two shot- REv. 1495 REv. , 1508 REv. , 1522 REv. -23 (1998 . 19 See; e.g., Turner v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 760 F. Supp. 1299 , 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1991 ) (plaintiff tenants evicted because of criminal conduct committed by their allegedly nonresident and nonguest children).
' See Chavez, 973 F.2d at 1248 (asserting that mother's eviction for son's criminal activity would have been impermissible were it based merely on their parent-child relationship); see also Tyson v. New York City Hous. Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513, 516-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1974 ) (holding that evicting a tenant "solely and exclusively because of the misdeeds of his adult child, who does not reside in the parental home," raises a valid claim for violation of a tenant's due process rights, namely the fundamental right of freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment).
2 See, e.g., Charlotte Hous. Auth. v. Patterson, 464 S.E.2d 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) .
2Id. at 70. His name was removed from the lease in 1988, but added back in 1991. Id. Givens was arrested two times from 1990-1992, including for murder. Id. An eviction notice was served on May 12, 1992 . Id. at 69.
2-4 24 C.F.R. § 966.4 (1) (2) (ii) (1997) . 25 560 N.E.2d 1131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990 ).
[Vol. 90 guns in her unit. 6 Her visiting half-brother admitted to stashing them there without Ms. Rose's knowledge or consent.
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Both academic commentators and evictee litigants have seized upon the fact that HUD and local public housing officials assert that tenants who "did not know [of] , could not foresee, or could not control [criminal] behavior," 2 are still vulnerable to one-strike evictions.2
Previous scholarly contributions have used the terms "no-fault" or "strict liability" interchangeably to describe this eviction standard;" 0 in keeping with the latest jurisprudential trends, however, this Comment will describe this practice as the eviction of an "innocent" tenant.
This Comment lays siege to the legal rationale supporting innocent evictions. Cut off from popular support, HUD's posi-26 Id. at 1132.
Id. at 1133. Rose's eviction was invalidated after ajury finding that she neither knew nor should have known that her brother placed guns in her apartment. Id. at 1132-34. The appellate court affirmed the propriety of the jury instructions requiring this finding. Id. at 1138. The court interpreted the plain language of the word "permit" in Rose's CHA lease to mean that a tenant must authorize or consent to a guest's criminal activity for an eviction to be valid. Id. at 1136-37. For discussion on the Substantive Due Process Clause, see infra, note 79 and accompanying text. For a discussion of civil liberties challenges to innocent evictions, see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
" Public Hous. Lease & Grievance Procedures, 56 Fed. Reg. 51560, 51567 (1991) (to be codified at 24 C.F.Rt pt. 966).
For an example of a litigated challenge to this contention, see Turner v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 760 F. Supp. 1299 Supp. , 1304 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (plaintiff contesting that CHA leaseholder "is responsible for his or her guests and visitors as long as they are on CHA property, even if the guest leaves the CHA property and later comes back to the property without the tenant's knowledge"). For an example of a general academic critique of the one-strike policy, see generallyJason Dzubow, Fear-Free Public Housing?: An Evaluation of HUD's "One Strike And You're Out" Housing Policy, 6 TEMP. POi-& CIv. RTS. L. REV. 55, 56 (1997) .
"' See, e.g., Mock, supra note 18, at 1497 n.10 ("This Note uses the terms no-fault evictions and strict liability evictions interchangeably to describe evictions that hold a tenant strictly liable for the actions of third parties.").
" See Rucker v. Davis, No. C98-00781 CRB, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345, at *4-*5 (N.C. Cal.June 19, 1998):
As defendants note ... [the term strictly liable] is a misnomer because the tenant is not being held liable, rather, the tenant forfeits her interest in the leasehold .... The Court will refer to the termination of tenancies under such circumstances as the termination of the lease of an "innocent" tenant as it is conceded that the tenant is innocent of the drug-related criminal activity which is the cause of the lease termination and it is alleged that the tenant is also innocent of any knowledge of the drug-related criminal activity.
[Vol. 90 don that a tenant targeted for eviction need not have knowledge of or consent to a third party's criminal activity has been weakened before an arsenal of challenges in the form of constitutional objections, 32 hostile lease interpretations, 3 3 and statutory silence on the matter.34 This Comment forwards two arguments. First, an analysis of section 1437d(1) (5) of the CranstonGonzalez National Affordable Housing Act of 1990, which authorizes C.F.R. § 966.4, reveals that Congress was silent on whether tenants need to have knowledge of or consent to the third party criminal activity for which they are evicted.s' This silence prevents courts from applying any statutorily created legal standard to evaluate HUD's regulatory interpretation of section 1437d(1) (5), beyond asking merely whether such lease termination conditions are "reasonable." 6 Second, Congress has the opportunity to fill this statutory gap by providing a mechanism for public housing tenants to determine the scope of the onestrike rule themselves, rather than abdicating that decision to the uncertain discretion of the judiciary, 32 SeeTyson v. NewYork City Hous. Auth., 369 F. Supp. 513, 518-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1974 ) (challenge to an eviction of tenants based on crimes committed by children no longer living with tenants states a claim for violation of tenants' substantive due process rights, and an eviction based on a relationship to a person who commits a crime violates the First Amendment right to freedom of association). For a discussion on other constitutional challenges to one-strike evictions, See Section III, infra notes 77-111 and accompanying text.
" See Chicago Hous. Auth. v. Rose, 560 N.E.2d 1131 , 1136 -37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990 ) (construing the lease term "permit" to mean that, for an eviction to be valid, the defendant must have consented to, or authorized the presence of, explosives or weapons in their unit).
3' See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1) (Supp. III 1997): Each public housing agency shall utilize leases which-. .. (5) provide that any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant, any member of the tenant's household, or any guest or other person under the tenant's control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy. Id. See also Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345 at *18 (noting that 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(1)(5) is silent on whether tenant knowledge of or consent to third party criminal activity is required).
" See § 1437d (1) 
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The following section provides a backdrop and summary of crime in public housing and HUD anti-crime strategies, and then lays out the law and official policy surrounding the onestrike rule as it currently stands. Part III describes the constitutional challenges that have been aimed at innocent evictions and other aspects of the one-strike rule. Part IV outlines various past and recent judicial reactions to innocent eviction lease terms, the instrument through which the one-strike rule's strictures are imposed. This discussion demonstrates the diversity of approaches that currently exist when federal regulation meets PHA discretion in lease clause drafting. Part V focuses on two recent interpretations of section 1437d(1) (5), and concludes that the statute's silence on the issue of tenant knowledge or consent, coupled with an ambiguous accompanying legislative history, demonstrates that Congress did not intend to decide the knowledge question. Part V resolves that in the absence of a clear Congressional mandate, courts must rely on the more broad pronouncement of section 1437d(l), that "[e]ach public housing agency shall utilize leases which-(1) do not contain unreasonable terms and conditions, 37 to decide whether failing to require tenant knowledge in eviction lease clauses amounts to an "unreasonable" lease term. This section concludes that the inherent uncertainty of a "reasonableness" standard allows courts to exercise considerable discretion in deciding whether to enforce innocent evictions.
Part VI suggests an alternative to leaving this issue up to the whim of a court's interpretive discretion. It proposes that section 1437d(1) (5) be amended to empower local public housing residents at each PHA to create a general rule determining the role of fault and knowledge of criminal activity in tenant evictions. This proposal finds support in (1) the language encouraging tenant consultation and citizen participation that can be found throughout HUD affordable housing legislation and policy, 8 (2) the advancement of tenant consultation as a method for empowering inner city and public housing residents in much more ambitious arenas, 9 and (3) popular accounts demonstrating that public housing residents are capable of achieving localized consensus on this discrete issue.
In recent years, the scholarly and legal attention paid to innocent evictions has kept pace with increasing public housing tenant concern.
4 1 This Comment concludes that public housing localized public housing strategies 741, 742 (N.Y. County Ct. 1998 ), rev'd, No. 1164 , 99-183, 1999 (N.Y. App. Div., Oct. 1 1999) (holding that for good cause to evict, a public housing tenant must be personally at fault for a guest's drug activity); Adams v. Franco, 638 N.Y.S.2d 1013, 1017-18 (Sup. Ct. 1996) (ruling that a PHA's refusal to grant a remaining family member a lease after his mother committed a crime was "so shocking to basic notions of fairness as to constitute an abuse of discretion"); Cabrera v. New York City Hous. Auth., 590 N.Y.S.2d 90, 91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (ruling that when a tenant's children were no longer living with her, she could not be evicted despite their drug offenses in the public housing complex); Corchado v. Popolizio, 567 N.Y.S.2d 460, 461-62 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding that "forfeiture of a significant property interest involves substantial due process concerns," and noting that it would be "shocking to one's sense of fairness to exclude non-offending tenants from public housing when an offending family member has been excluded from the household at the time of the hearing"); Hines v. New York City Hous. Auth., 413 N.Y.S.2d 733, 735 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) 46 the popular view of crime in public housing is that it is the worst of our worst-that PHAs are suffering from the most intense concentration of our country's greatest social dilemma.
HUD's responsibility to fund and oversee local PHAs nationwide 8 makes it both an effective and rare conduit through which the federal government can approach the problems of crime. Although the federal government's political incentive to battle crime is great, its opportunities are limited, as law enforcement powers are exercised primarily on the state and local level. 49 Representatives, 103d Cong. 96 (1994) (statement of Representative Gutierrez) ("It is a crisis that, I believe, has become the greatest challenge facing our nation-how do we protect our homes, our streets, our families from crime and violence?"). See also id. at 9 (statement of Senator MoseleyBraun) ("[I]n many federally financed public housing projects, the level of violence has reached epidemic proportions, threatening on a daily basis the lives of the majority of the tenants who are law abiding."). needed funding for maintenance and development." This relationship empowers HUD to direct PHA policy by tying funding to HUD-approved anti-crime programs.
5 ' Currently, HUD supports five strategies for reducing crime and drugs in public housing. 2 Two of these programs, the Priority City Initiative and the Priority City Prevention Initiative, bring together local and federal law enforcement officials and the directors of the nation's most troubled PHAs to create innovative law enforcement and crime prevention strategies. 53 Two other grant programs, the Housing Drug Elimination Program and Operation Safe Home, involve public housing residents in combating crime and drugs. 4 The Housing Drug Elimination Program offers grants to PHAs that are used to fund local tenant anti-crime patrols, community drug prevention, intervention and treatment programs, tenant job training for security guard work, as well as increased law enforcement, security, and physical safety improvements that enhance security. 3-4 (1996) [hereinafter ONE STRUE] . This HUD-issued guide advises individual PHAs on the one-strike policy in general, as well as HUD's evaluationbased incentive program to encourage implementation. Id. "Under such a performance evaluation system, a high-scoring, high-performing PHA would receive less federal oversight and may be eligible to receive additional formula funds ... ; a PHA with a failing PHMAP score would be ineligible for such additional funding and could ultimately face a HUD takeover of its management." Id. at 4.
", See generally STATE OF THE CITIES, supra note 49, at 36 (naming HUD programs that provide funding to PHAs). "HUD empowers public housing authorities (PHAs) and their local partners with tools to target crime and drugs in public housing." Id.
52 See The White House, supra note 47. ("Vice President Gore today joined Attorney General Janet Reno and Housing and Urban Development Secretary Andrew Cuomo in announcing a new four-part strategy to protect public housing residents from the scourge of crime and drugs."). The fifth strategy, one-strike housing evictions, was not mentioned in this White House press release. Operation Safe Home "targets the collective resources of federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, public housing staff, and residents to stamp out the worst infestations of gangs, drugs, and violent crime in public housing developments and the surrounding neighborhoods." 56 Safe Home provides dollars for local strategies that combine tenant vigilance and information with aggressive law enforcement tactics that result in raids, arrests, and convictions.
The fifth program is easily distinguished from the other four in that its implementation involves neither law enforcement nor public housing tenants. The fifth program has been dubbed by President Clinton "One Strike and You're Out.
B. "ONE STRIKE, YOU'RE OUT"-THE TERMS OF A NATIONAL POLICY
After first proposing the one-strike policy during his January 23, 1996 State of the Union Address, 9 President Clinton made the policy official that following March by announcing: "This policy today is a clear signal to drug dealers and to gangs: If you break the law, you no longer have a home in public housing, 'one strike and you're out.' That should be the law everywhere in America."60
In fact, the President's strongly worded challenge created no new law. One housing authority director commented that since the one-strike policy was announced, "We really haven't changed anything. Itjust has a catchy little ring to it.
'6 2 Prior to 36-37 (1996) [hereinafter PUBLIC HOUSING THAT WORKS] (describing Operation Safe Home's cooperative efforts to target "the worst infestations of gangs, drugs, and violent crime in public housing developments and their surrounding neighborhoods"). ' The White House, supra note 44.
'9 See Clinton, supra note 4, at *8. HUD regulations give administrative force to this legislative mandate.64 Consequently, most individual PHAs include similar language in tenant leases.65 These lease provisions "make involvement in drugs or serious criminal activity a basis for barring people from moving into public housing and for eviction.
" 6
However, neither section 1437d(1) (5) nor its regulatory counterpart require that PHA leases conform to the one-strike mold. 67 HUD does, however, encourage the one-strike policy's Tampa 1 ("But Tampa Housing Authority Attorney Ricardo Gilmore explained the new policy doesn't substantially change rules at the agency.").
42 U.S.C. § 1437d (1) (5) [T]enant, any member of the household, or another person under the tenant's control, shall not engage in (i) Any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other public housing residents or threatens the health and safety of the housing authority employees.., or (ii) Any drug-related criminal activity on or near the premises ....
Id.
, The White House, supra note 44. It should be noted that the one-strike policy includes empowering PHAs to exclude public housing applicants on the basis of prior criminal activity. See ONE STRmE, supra note 50, at 5 ("The first essential element of a One Strike policy is to ensure that those who engage in illegal drug use or other criminal activities that endanger the well-being of residents are not allowed to live in public housing."). See also PuBuc HoUSING THAT WoRKs, supra note 57, at 34-35.
("[S] tricter admission policies.., include comprehensive background checks on applicants, cooperation with courts and law enforcement agencies to gain access to criminal records, and a fair and flexible tenant selection process that may involve current public housing residents."). This Comment will focus on the one-strike policy's eviction prong. 67 See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d() (5) (1997) . See also 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f) (12) (i) (1999); Stephen G. Reed, Families Affected By "One Strike" Two Mothers Have Had Their Children application by using it as a criterion to evaluate individual PHAs; enforcing the policy can lead to higher scores on PHA performance evaluations, which might lead to less federal oversight and even additional funding.e HUD officials have commented publicly that failing to implement the one-strike policy will result in more strict federal agency supervision for a local PHA. 6 ' In addition to refraining from requiring one-strike lease language, HUD also asserts that complicated cases involving innocent evictions "will require discretion on the part of public housing managers." 70 HUD regulations make it clear, however, that PHAs are not required to exercise discretion, but have the option to do so:
In deciding to evict for criminal activity, the PHA shall have discretion to consider all of the circumstances of the case, including the seriousness of the offense, the extent of participation by family members, and the effects that the eviction would have on family members not involved in the proscribed activity.71
Essentially, PHAs are given discretion to decide whether they should exercise discretion when evaluating a one-strike eviction. 72 This option, however, is not available to courts that Banned From the Complex Due to Drug-Related Offenses, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB., July 11, 1996, at lB ("The policy is not a strict requirement. Local housing authoritieswhich oversee subsidized apartment complexes nationwide-decide whether to implement the policy.").
See App. 1994 ) ("Section 966.4(o0(5) (i) does not require that the Housing Authority consider the circumstances of each and every case, nor does it require that the Housing review PHA evictions. One Pennsylvania court has held that a judicial review that takes evicted tenants' extraordinary or mitigating circumstances into account amounts to an improper substitution of PHA discretionary authority. 7 s The option to exercise case-by-case discretion may allow public housing officials to soften the impact of the one-strike rule. Applying discretion does not, however, provide any legal justification for the policy itself, and does not respond to any constitutional, jurisprudential, or statutory interpretive challenges to innocent evictions. An individual PHA decision to exercise its innocent eviction power selectively can promote equitable resolutions in seemingly intractable situations; 74 however, the eviction power itself still exists without restriction, no matter how much the blow is softened in practice. 5 Therefore, an analysis of the constitutional issues, lease terms, and attempts at statutory interpretation are necessary to any comprehensive evaluation of the one-strike policy and its approach to innocent evictions. 76 Authority consider all of the specified factors.
[It] grants... discretion to decide whether it wants to consider 1) the circumstances of a case and 2) the specified factors.") (emphasis added).
SeeAllegheny County Hous. Auth. v. Liddell, 722 A.2d 750, 753 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (holding that trial court's decision that one household member should not be evicted for another's criminal activity was an improper judicial substitution of authorityjudgment and discretion).
7' See McCormick, supra note 10, at South Tampa 1 ("Gilmore said current leases give the authority the option of taking a family situation into account.").
7 See Dzubow, supra note 29, at 59 ("However, if the PHA does not have authority to evict the family, the fact that agencies choose not to evict families who lack knowledge of a family member's criminal activity is not constitutionally adequate protection."). REv. 257, 260-64 (1996) . Hornstein offers a practitioner's guide for arguing third party criminal activity eviction cases, advising public interest lawyers to distinguish their client's case on the facts and make "a defense from something other than whole cloth, from the facts." Id. at 271. Even Hornstein felt compelled to review the constitutional and other legal issues involved, id. at 260-64, although ultimately he recommends that actual litigants take a different tack. Id. at 271-72.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO ONE-STRIKE EVICTIONS
Not all constitutionally grounded challenges to the onestrike policy focus on the eviction of tenants who claim to be innocent. Tenant evictions triggered by criminal activity have been challenged as violations of the Double Jeopardy, 7 Excessive Fines, 7s and both the Substantive 79 and Procedural Due Process 80 Clauses of the Constitution. In one such case, a New Jersey District Court heard the plaintiffs claim that his eviction from a Bayonne Housing Authority apartment following a conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia amounted to Double Jeopardy,"' Excessive Fines, 2 and Substantive Due Process 3 violations. 84 First, the plaintiff claimed he was being punished twice and fined excessively for the same criminal activity. A prerequisite and necessary element to both the Double Jeopardy and Excessive Fines claims was a finding that the state action, the eviction, was intended in part as punishment and not for SeeTaylor v. Cisneros, 913 F. Supp. 314, 316 (D.N.J. 1995 remedial purposes. s The court held that the statute invoked eviction powers "to protect tenants from drugs and other related criminal activity" and that " [e] victing an insidious tenant is a rational and effective means of protecting all other tenants from activity antithetical to their health, safety and welfare." 8 6 The court found that the remedy went "no further than necessary to effectuate the statute's purpose, ,87 and was not intended to be punitive. It held that there was no second punishment in violation of the Double Jeopardy clause, no excessive fine, and no "punishment so plainly arbitrary and oppressive as to violate the due process clause. 88 Another line of cases feature litigants who have sought to attack one-strike evictions on procedural due process grounds. These cases challenge PHAs for failing to offer adequate preeviction grievance hearings. 9 In 1990, the 1937 Housing Act 9°w as amended to "allow elimination of pre-eviction administrative procedures only in cases where certain types of criminal activity is involved." 9 '
HUD's regulations posit that such administrative hearings are not required if the HUD Secretary determines that the state where a PHA is located offers preeviction court grievance procedures that satisfy a list of applicable due process procedural requirements. 9 2 The Secretary employs a list of HUD-promulgated due process guidelines to guide this determination. 3 96 held that evicting a tenant "solely and exclusively because of the misdeeds of his adult child, who does not reside in the parental home, 97 stated a claim for violation of a tenant's due process rights, namely the fundamental right of freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment." This First Amendment protection is applied to state actions via Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.9 The court also found a valid Substantive Due Process claim, finding that " [it] here must be some causal nexus between the imposition of the sanction of eviction and the plaintiffs' own conduct." 1°°B y relying on a "causal nexus" test, Tyson creates a threshold standard for evictee behavior in cases of non-resident, non-guest criminal activity: that there must be a direct connection between the criminal activity cited and the tenant's own conduct for an eviction to stick. Tyson, however, does not apply to the other forms that innocent evictions may take, including eviction 9 Lexis search conducted October 20, 1998. Boolean search in FEDCTS library: "1437d(k) and evictl" The 3 cases cited above, supra note 89, were based on evictions for first party criminal activity evictions served prior to the 1990 amendment.
9' For a comprehensive review of civil liberties challenges to innocent evictions dating back to the 1970s, see Dzubow, supra note 29, at 58-61. From his analysis, Dzubow concludes "[lilt is difficult to draw a general rule from the sparse case law available on the subject of evicting families for the actions of one member of their household or of a guest." Id-at 61. The Turner court agreed with both the Housing Authority and the evicted tenant plaintiffs that "to succeed on their substantive due process claims, plaintiffs must show that defendants' actions (1) deprived plaintiffs of their property (2) for an irrational or invidious purpose.' '0 4 The court also found that it would be an irrational deprivation "to evict one of the plaintiffs based on the conduct of a third party when there is no causal nexus between that plaintiff and the third party."' 05 The court declined, however, to hold that "unbeknownst-to-tenant" guest criminal conduct demonstrated an insufficient nexus on its face, and remanded the issue to trial for a finding of fact.0°T he constitutional issues pertinent to tenant evictions are not always adjudicated consistently. While some courts may find that constitutional issues are fact sensitive, 0 7 other courts may refrain from making such inquiries entirely. 0 [Vol. 90 lease interpretation requiring some tenant knowledge of the criminal activity rendered any due process causal nexus inquiry unnecessary."' It is not uncommon, therefore, for constitutional concerns to take a back seat to other plaintiff claims, as is often the case when an issue of lease interpretation arises."'
IV. INNOCENT EVICTION LEASE INTERPRETATIONS
Many innocent eviction cases look primarily at the language of the relevant lease clauses to divine the breadth of a housing authority's eviction power."' This approach was common prior to the 1990 codification of U.S.C. § 1437d (1) (5), when the scope of criminal activity eviction clauses (and their language) was left purely to individual PHA preference." 8 For example, in Spence v. O'Brien, 1 4 the court interpreted a lease clause that provided for termination of tenancy "in the event the tenant uses the premises for immoral or illegal purposes." 5 The court held that the provision warranted eviction following a guest's criminal activity only if the tenant was aware of and able to prevent a guest's illegal conduct, regardless of the tenant's own personal involvement.116 In Housing Authority of Decatur v. Brown," 7 the Decatur Housing Authority issued a more exacting provision, requiring that a tenant "refrain from illegal activity" and "conduct himself and cause other persons on the premises with his consent to conduct themselves in a manner which would not disturb his neighbors' peaceable enjoyment . .. and [which] would be conducive to maintaining the project in a decent, safe and sanitary condition.""" Even with this more strict provision, the court in Brown held that neither "the bare occurrence of a and held that its presence in the lease supported the trial .,9 Id. at 503 (plaintiff tenant's guest was brought in on a misdemeanor arrest for possession of a small amount of marijuana for personal consumption).
" Id-In addition, prior to the 1990 codification, state courts in both Georgia and Hawaii held that a tenant must have knowledge of third party criminal activity for a public housing eviction to stand. See Housing Auth. v. Brown, 349 S.E.2d 501, 503 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that a tenant should not be evicted when he did not know of or consent to the use of his apartment by others for criminal activity); see also Williams v. Hawaii Hous. Auth., 690 P.2d 285, 291-92 (Haw. Ct. App. 1984 ) (holding that a tenant's awareness of the violent acts of her children was necessary for eviction, but also that such awareness of and ability to prevent violent behavior of a household member should be inferred where there is a history of violent acts).
12' 42 U.S.C § 1437d (1) (5) court's instruction that "in order to find for the CHA, the jury had to find that the defendant knew or should have known of the presence of the guns in her apartment." 1 2 Rose demonstrates that when PHA leases use terms indicating awareness or consent, a knowledge requirement is necessary to warrant an eviction, at least in Illinois state court. 30 
V. KNOWLEDGE OR CONTROL STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Many PHA leases fail to contain convenient "consent" language; rather, they more closely adhere to their ambiguous statutory and regulatory parentage.
13 ' As a result, courts looking to determine whether there is a knowledge prerequisite for tenant eviction must look to section 1437d (1) (5) " See e.g., Minneapolis Public Hous. Auth. v. Lor, 578 N.W.2d 9 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (noting that housing authority lease language on eviction for criminal activity resembles language of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d (1) (5) and 24 C.F.R. § 966.4(f) (12) (ii)).
122 467 U. S. 837 (1984) . For a comprehensive look at the Chevron doctrine and its prominence in administrative law, see GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 541-645 (1998 To give Chevron's first step force, a reviewing court may invalidate an administrative regulation which conflicts with the clear congressional intent of an authorizing statute.1 4 0 However, the fact that a statute is silent on a precise issue (e.g., whether knowledge is required for tenant eviction) does not in and of itself preclude any agency interpretation and subsequent regulatory promulgation from withstanding Chevron scrutiny."4 If, under step two, the court finds an agency's interpretation of a silent or ambiguous statute to be "permissible," the agency's construction is given force. 4 However, even when a court determines that the statutory language is clear, it may still find some ambiguity if the language's clear meaning does not conform to the strongly stated congressional intent found in the Act's legislative history. For example, in Charlotte Housing Authority v. Patterson 1 43 the tenant mother and her two daughters were evicted following the arrest of her son, a fellow household member, on murder charges. 44 The plaintiff argued that section 1437d (1) (5) [Vol. 90 public housing tenant to be evicted "when she was not personally at fault for a breach of the lease by a member of her household.' 4 5 The lease used language very similar to section 1437d(1) (5): "I also understand that if I, members of my household, our guests or visitors, and other persons under our control, engage in criminal activity... on or near CHA property, the CHA may end my lease." 4 The court observed that while neither the lease nor its governing statute made any mention of personal fault, it did state clearly that criminal activity ends the entire tenancy, and does not just eject the criminally active tenant.
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The court continued, however, to contrast this seemingly clear interpretive result with the 1990 Cranston-Gonzalez Act's legislative history." 4 It first cited a Senate committee report declaring that "eviction would not be the appropriate course if the tenant had no knowledge of the criminal activities of his/her guests or had taken reasonable steps under the circumstances to prevent the activity.', 49 The court then funneled the perceived contradiction between statutory language and legislative history through Supreme Court precedent:
[elven if the plain language of the statute appears to settle the question, a Court still looks "to the legislative history to determine ... whether there is clearly expressed legislative intention contrary to the language which would . . . question the strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses." Sess. 179 (1990) ). The report continued: "The Committee assumes that if the tenant had no knowledge of the criminal activity or took reasonable steps to prevent it, then good cause to evict the innocent family members would no exit [sic] ." Id.
'0 Id. at 556 (citing INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) ). The importance of legislative history in reviewing an agency's statutory interpretation is by no means a settled issue. Compare Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 421 (more than 10 pages devoted to a discussion of the relevant statute's legislative history) with Wagner
The Patterson court interpreted the statute based on a "clearly expressed legislative intent that eviction is appropriate only if the tenant is personally at fault for a breach of the lease,""" choosing to rely more heavily on legislative history than the agency's interpretation or the plain meaning of the statute. 15" The Rucker v. Davis decision, however, rejected both Patterson's take on the plain meaning of section 1437d(1) (5) and its interpretation of the relevant legislative history, finding both to be "either silent or ambiguous" on the issue of tenant knowledge or control.
5 3 In Rucker v. Davis, two independent plaintiffs consolidated their claims after each was evicted for the criminal activity of members of their household of which neither had knowledge. 5 While Patterson acknowledged that certain Senate reports expressed Congress' clear intent to protect tenants from eviction in the absence of knowledge of or control over criminal activity,' 5 the Rucker court accepted the defendants' contrary argument that the senators making these comments "simply did not prevail in their attempts to include language in the statute which would have protected 'innocent' tenants." 1 6 While the Seed Co. v. Bush, 946 F.2d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (very little attention to legislative history employed in Chevron statutory analysis). See also LAWSON, supra note 132, at 580-98. Of course, some members of the Supreme Court think that legislative history is wholly irrelevant to any statutory interpretation. See, e.g., U.S. v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 534 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I have in the past been critical of the Court's using the so-called legislative history of an enactment (hearings, committee reports, and floor debates) to determine its meaning ... Today, however, the Court's fascination with the files of Congress (we must consult them, because they are there) is carried to a new silly extreme.").
. "' See id-at *5-*6. Plaintiff Pearlie Rucker, her grandchildren and great-grandchild were evicted after her mentally disabled daughter (who lived with her) was caught possessing cocaine three blocks from their apartment, and her adult son, who did not live in the apartment, was caught with cocaine in his possession eight blocks away. Id. Plaintiff Herman Walker, a disabled 75-year-old, was evicted after his live-in caregiver and his guests were found to have possessed cocaine in Walker's apartment, without Walker's knowledge or awareness. Id.
,-' See Patterson, 464 S.E.2d at 72 (citing S. Rep. No. 316, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 179(1990) ). See also supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345 at *17.
desire to protect innocent tenants was reflected in the statement, the court failed to find evidence demonstrating that the statement's intent could be found in the statute.
7
However, the court also rejected the defendants' twopronged contention that the Cranston-Gonzalez Act's legislative history demonstrates Congress did intend to permit innocent tenant lease termination, choosing instead to find that the history was inconclusive.1 58 First, the defendants had introduced a now-expired emergency supplemental appropriations measure,' -59 which directed the HUD Secretary to issue waivers for eviction administrative grievance procedures for household members not involved in criminal activity.' 6° They argued that this indicated that Congress thought innocent tenants (i.e., those not involved in criminal activity) could be evicted, and were only deserving of additional procedural protection.
6
' The court rejected this argument by countering that even if Congress had intended a knowledge or control requirement, additional grievance procedures could still have been necessary "since the statute would permit terminating the leases of tenants who knew of the activity but were not personally involved." ' 62 Second, the court denied that floor debate language reflecting Congressional concern over drug use in public housing by people not on public housing leaseS1 6 3 "equate [d] with an intention to permit termination of the leases of 'innocent' tenants. ' 64 Finding the statute and the legislative history to be inconclusive, the court moved on to the second Chevron step-assessing whether HUD's statutory interpretation was permissible.
1 6
Since no rule on tenant knowledge could be extracted from section 1437d(1) (5), the court retreated to the more broad coverage found in another section of the same statute-section 1437d(1)(1)'s edict that "[e]ach public housing agency shall utilize leases which-(1) do not contain unreasonable terms and conditions."'1 To divine an objective approach through which to apply this reasonableness standard, the court turned to "[t]he only federal court which has addressed what constitutes an 'unreasonable' lease term in a published opinion,"' 67 the Eastern District of Virginia in Richmond Tenants Organization v. Richmond Redevelopment and Housing Authority. 8 In Richmond, the court interpreted section 1437d(1) (1) "to require that lease terms be rationally related to a legitimate housing purpose."' 69 It held that off-premises misdemeanor marijuana or alcohol charges were not "reasonably related to a housing problem" 70 and found that a lease clause requiring tenants to "refrain from the illegal use, sale, or distribution of drugs and alcoholic beverages on or off the premises,' 7 ' or face eviction, was unreasonable.
The Rucker court, meanwhile, declared that under Richmond's reasonableness standard it could not on a motion to dismiss find as a matter of law that terminating the leases of "innocent" tenants is unreasonable. The Court simply cannot conclude-without any evidence before it-that the statute is not overbroad by permitting evictions of tenants who themselves had no knowledge and no reason to know of the drug-related criminal activity of another, or of tenants who had no ability .
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to control the alleged wrong-doer.
Determining that the lease term's reasonableness was a question of fact properly decided at the trial level, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and issued a preliminary injunction on eviction proceedings prior to trial' 73 '6 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(/) (1) (1998).
6,
7 Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345 at *19-*20. ' 751 F. Supp. 1204 (E.D. Va. 1990 . 17 Id (emphasis added). , 72 Rucker, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9345 at *20-*21. As the Rucker v. Davis decision stands, the propriety of an innocent eviction hinges on an individual court's factual interpretation of an alarmingly broad standard: whether a lease term is "reasonable." 1 74 That Richmond defines the reasonableness standard as whether the lease term "is reasonably related to a housing problem" '7 5 does not reduce the breadth of a court's discretion and potential for inconsistency.
That such a large policy controversy will be decided inconsistently seems even more likely when one considers how factsensitive innocent eviction trials already are. 76 One commentator and public interest attorney with experience in trying onestrike innocent eviction cases argues that the outcome of an innocent eviction contest will often turn on the defense attorney's development of the facts of the eviction and her client's life. 77 Moreover, the uncertainty of outcome inherent in any jury trial 78 virtually guarantees that the legality of innocent evictions in a particular jurisdiction will depend on a discretionary legal standard, the facts of the particular situation, the effectiveness of the trial attorneys, and jury discretion.' 7 9 17, 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(/) (1) (1998).
171 Richmond, 751 F. Supp. at 1206.
'76 See Hornstein, supra note 76, at 270-76. Note also how fact sensitive the outcome of litigated constitutional issues can be, supra note 106 and accompanying text.
'7 Id. at 268 ("You need to develop the facts to learn about your client and your client's life. Otherwise, the local housing authority will be able to define who your client is, and their definition will not be very flattering.").
'7' Hornstein strongly recommends opting for ajury trial, reasoning thatjurors are more likely to be swayed by an evicted plaintiff's personal predicament. Id. at 271-72.
171 Id. For an example of when a reasonableness standard is applied inconsistently on a case by case basis, see STEFANIE LIEBERMAN, RESOLVING CASES OF NAzi-LOOTED ART 49 (1999) (on file with author). When an original owner of a piece of stolen art brings a suit for conversion against its current possessor, courts have determined that the statute of limitations on that claim begins to accrue at the point when a reasonable original owner should have known of the work's location. See O'Keeffe v. Snyder, 416 A.2d 862, 870 (N.J. 1980) . The point at which a reasonable original owner would have conducted a duly diligent search is calculated by the court on a factual, B. PROPOSAL
The Amendment
While the multifaceted uncertainty of the reasonableness standard can be used to the advantage of either party, 80 this
Comment proposes that this popular and legal controversy will not be settled without a clear statutory mandate. To date, Congress has not given section 1437d (1) While tenant boards would have to be mindful of these potential constitutional limits,"" any tenant-promulgated amendment would pose no greater constitutional concern than the onestrike rule does currently, where eviction power exists essentially unfettered.' 8 9 Moreover, any legal challenge to this localized rule would be not only more difficult to make, but also less likely to prevail, since public housing residents would promulgate the standard themselves. Many innocent eviction challenges are based on the notion that PHA officials are abusing their discretion by applying an unjust law. 1 9°2 SUN-TIMES, Jan. 30, 1993 , at 3 ("CHA residents vote today to elect some 900 representatives to 19 resident advisory councils."). Resident Local Advisory Councils ("LACs") have existed since 1971 and operate beneath an umbrella tenants' organization, the Central Advisory Council ("CAC"). Patrick Reardon, CHA Councils Don 't Aid Tenants, Critics Contend, CHIcAGO TRIB., Oct. 4, 1987, at Cl. In the past, LAC's have been criticized for being perceived as a "rubber stamp for the CHA's management and a political arm of Mayor Harold Washington," according to a wide range of critics." Id.
" Telephone Interview with Sarah Ruffin, LAC board member and Homer Homes resident (Feb. 18, 1999) This general spirit advocating tenant involvement is peppered throughout the 1990 Act and its committee reports.
A more recent statement of HUD public housing policy not only incorporates notions of tenant participation, but values the public housing residential community as a PHA's primary asset: "[a]s traditional sources of revenue diminish, public housing managers are re-examining a previously little-used resource: the energy and efforts of residents of public housing themselves. 2 2 Not only does facilitating tenant involvement in public housing community building enable PHA managers to tap into a resource of shared interests, 2t HUD argues, it improves the lives, prospects, and opportunities for autonomy for residents themselves. 4 Moreover, HUD asserts, individual PHA programs and " S. REP. No. 101-316, at 198-99 (1990 '[a] ny solution to the drug problem would have to be desired, and developed, locally,' we believe that drug abuse is a national problem that demands a national response as well as active local involvement.").
2 Ties that Bind, supra note 191, at 1.
211 Id. at 13 (noting that public housing managers should take advantage of residents' determination to combat crime and other neighborhood issues). at 13. "Community building encourages residents to take on leadership and responsibility rather than be passive recipients of services." Id. at 1. "Community building works because it builds the capacity of residents to: Take charge of their own
1999]
ADAMP. HELLEGERS policies are more likely to be accepted and successful if residents are identifying their community's goals and designing implementation strategies themselves." 5 Empowering tenants to set the parameters of the one-strike policy's reach fits logically into HUD's own rhetoric for advocating tenant involvement. Such reform enables individual PHAs to take advantage of their residents' desire to prevent crime, fosters a sense of independence and community involvement among involved residents, and encourages residents to take ownership of the one-strike rule, thus increasing acceptance, compliance, and cooperative reporting of criminal activity.
While HUD policy and practice is replete with the language of tenant participation, no previous legislation has mandated that public housing residents play a controlling role in individual PHA operation, beyond the weak citizen participation clause found in section 107 of the 1990 National Affordable Housing Act. 206 Members of Congress have, however, repeatedly affirmed their belief in the efficacy of tenant management programs. 207 To hold Congress to its rhetorical commitment, academics and redevelopment advocates have called for the statutory ratification of more meaningful consultation and decisionmaking authority for public housing tenants. 2 08 For example, Marvin Krislov argues "that meaningful tenant consultation must occur before HUD approves the demolition or sale of public houslives. Support each other's efforts to improve life for themselves and their children. Participate constructively in the life of the community, thereby improving conditions and prospects for all." Id. at 13.
2" Id. at 14 ("Through resident participation in setting goals and designing implementation strategies, residents assume ownership of the process. They are then more likely to participate in the programs that are developed and likely to experience a greater percentage of success than with a top-down approach."). OF HOPE 4 (1994) . The resident-majority DSNI board implemented a complicated and comprehensive 13-point revitalization plan, ranging from vacant land acquisition and redevelopment financing to local job training and neighborhood business development. Id. at 57, 109-10. The Dudley Street area did not include any public housing developments.
2,4 Quinones, supra note 39, at 771-72. Ironically, many "downtown elites," including Riley Foundation Board members and pro bono corporate lawyers, sat on the DSNI board, and ensured that residents had the necessary financing and technical building to make the Dudley Street revitalization a success. MEDOrF & SKLAR, supra note 213, at 53-58.
Moreover, it is important to stress that Homer's success is not an isolated one. In fact, there are currently fourteen federal housing projects across the country operated solely by tenantmanagement organizations. 15 Three of these tenant-run housing developments have recently experienced trouble in the form of accusations of corruption and mismanagement." However, Bromley-Heath, the nation's first tenant-managed public housing complex, recently settled its problems with the Boston Housing Authority, and retained control of the 1,500 apartment complex it has managed exclusively for 25 years. In many PHAs, tenant management is not a pipe dream, but a reality; requiring all PHAs to settle this controversy by empowering residents in every authority might enable more PHAs to realize HUD's resident management community building goals.
D. ABILITY TO BUILD A LOCAL CONSENSUS
Lastly, popular outcry over the one-strike policy has demonstrated that while PHA tenant opinion varies on the issue of innocent evictions, often a localized consensus is expressed at PHA tenant meetings and in newspaper articles. Undoubtedly, determining the scope of the one-strike rule involves difficult decisions, and an overwhelming resident consensus cannot always be expected. Homer LAC board member Sarah Ruffin, 22 for example, feels that evictions for third party criminal activity are fair if the tenant knows of her guest, fellow household member, or son's actions. She acknowledges, however, that while many of her fellow Homer residents might agree with her, many others might find this stance too harsh, especially because they "love their children. ' 2 While Ruffin tells all of her relatives not to visit her if they are going to deal drugs "because I could be evicted," she recognizes that not all residents would feel like they could separate themselves from their children for any reason, especially if they are minors. 223 Ruffin also applauds CHA's current discretionary practice of not evicting an entire household for one member's criminal activity if that member is taken off of the lease immediately. 224 Even though she worries about how resident opinion might differ on what she considers a difficult decision, Ruffin sees room for compromise, and is confident that the LAC and its resident constituents could come to a resolution.s 219 See Bowman, supra note 3 ("More than 100 people attended the first hearing on the proposed rules yesterday. Although some praised the lease, most residents argued that it violates their rights and must be changed."). 22 See Out the Door, supra note 11, at 10A ("The new policy is a serious but necessary step .... Many public housing residents, weary of the drugs, gangs and guns that often make normal life impossible within the close confines of a development virtually ruled by criminals, will welcome the new policy.").
2*'Telephone Interview with Sarah Ruffin, supra note 193.
2 id.
' Id. Making a distinction between minors and adults introduces a possible compromise position with regard to knowledge of a third party's criminal behavior.
2' Id. However, she also alleges that CHA usually fails to exercise their one-strike authority. Ruffin says that CHA rarely evicts anyone for criminal activity; usually, even drug dealers are evicted for non-payment of rent. Aug. 20, 1996 , at South Tampa 1.
Bowman, supra note 1, at All.
2 An "include residents, but retain final control" approach is stated more explicitly in HUD materials advising PHAs to involve tenants in the one-strike screening process. See One Strike, supra note 50, at 6:
Because they have a clear and immediate stake in the outcome of tenant selections, current public housing residents sometimes are the toughest screeners of new admissions. Some PHAs have successfully used resident screening advisory committees. These committees may advise PHAs, but PHAs must remain responsible for the final decision to admit or decline a potential tenant.
Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 90 enable both Congress and HUD to live up to their stated objective to engage tenants in the management and development of public housing communities. Moreover, a departure from the existing statutory language would discourage a reviewing court from employing the inherently discretionary reasonableness standard it currently enjoys. The proposed amendment takes a controversial policy decision away from the courts and places it in the hands of public housing tenants, the very people who are most directly affected by the one-strike policy.
